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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAY A. LE:MBACH, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Docket No. 17095 
vs. ) 
BARBARA A. cox, ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the natural father (plaintiff) of a child 
born out of wedlock against the child's natural mother (defendant) for 
custody of the child. The mother counterclaimed for custody and also sought 
an interest in the father's property. The property claims were settled by the 
parties without trial and are not involved in this appeal. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Upon a trial to the court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, and 
after past trial motions, the court entered an Amended Judgment (R. 175) 
and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 171) awarding 
custody to defendant and granting plaintiff reasonable visitation. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Amended Judgment and remand of the 
case to the District Court with directions to enter judgment in favor of 
plaintiff that he be awarded custody of the parties' child, with liberal and 
reasonable visitation for defendant, or, m the alternative, reversal and 
remand of the case to the District Court for new trial with directions as to 
the proper standards to apply in resolving the issues in dispute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant are the natural father and mother of Thaddeus 
Justin Lembach, born August 15, 1978. The parties have never been 
married, but they resided together in plaintiff's residence at 781 First 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, between October, 1977, and June, 1979. 
After the child's birth and until June 6, 1979, the parties jointly cared for 
and raised the child at plaintiff's home. Each of the parties took an active 
and substantial role in providing the child with love, attention, care and 
guidance, although plaintiff provided virtually all of the financial support. 
In all material respects, the parties conducted themselves as "a family." 
In June, 1979, the parties separated, and defendant took the child with 
her to her parents' home in Connecticut and to visit friends in Nova Scotia, 
Canada. In August, 1979, because defendant wanted to travel to Ireland, the 
parties agreed that plaintiff would care for the child in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
during that month. On September 4, 1979, fearing defendant's threats to 
· deprive him of parental rights by forcibly removing the child from the State 
of Utah (Verified Complaint, paragraph 9, R. 3) plaintiff initiated the instant 
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51: 
action and obtained an order granting him temporary custody and support of 
the child (R. 17). After a hearing on September 14, 1979, the court entered 
a stipulated temporary custody and support order (R. 24) granting plaintiff 
and defendant "joint" responsibility for the custody and care of the child on 
an equal basis pending trial. 
In connection with a pre-trial motion by defendant to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint, the court expressly found and concluded that: 
plaintiff has adopted the minor child by acknowledgment "for all 
purposes" in accordance with 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), and that plaintiff has a right to custody in accordance with 
the "best interest of the child" as shall be determined at the time 
of trial. (R. 88) 
A trial on the merits was held before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on 
March 12, 1980. Dr. Leslie Cooper, a licensed clinical psychologist and 
professor at the University of Utah, conducted a pre-trial evaluation of both 
parties, prepared a written report (Ex. P-1), and testified at trial 
(R. 232-264). In his report, Dr. Cooper made the following observations and 
recommendations: 
I believe that both Barabara and Jay both sincerely love and 
care about Thaddeus, quite apart from their using him and his care 
as a means of manipulating the other. I believe that Thaddeus 
feels very comfortable with and is attached to both Barbara and 
Jay. I could find little evidence from a physchological perspective 
to support the claims made by each party as to why the other 
should not have custody. I could find no evidence that Jay is so 
emotionally disturbed as to be a danger to Thaddeus' psychological 
growth. Nor could I find evidence that Jay was irresponsible in 
his behavior toward Thaddeus. At the same time, I could find no 
evidence that Barbara is suffering from a severe emotional problem. 
On the basis of these psychological considerations, it is my 
recommendation that Barbara and Jay be given joint custody of 
Thaddeus, if the court can find means of terminating the 
manipulation of one another. A legal decree may stop the threats 
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of "each taking Thaddeus from the other. " Their dependency on 
each other in caring for Thaddeus must end, and each must find 
his/her own solutions to the problems which arise in caring for 
Thaddeus when is is with them. Constructive means must be found 
to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions to common child rearing 
problems which naturally arise. I believe the present joint custody 
procedures could be continued, or the stay might be lengthened to 
a week. 
There are problems with such a recommendation, namely, that 
the conditions required for its success cannot be legislated. Were 
the implimentation of this recommendation not feasible, it would then 
be my recommenation that Barbara be awarded custody of 
Thaddeus, and Jay be awarded liberal visitation rights. Such 
rights would not necessitate the need for supervision. In view of 
the plans of Barbara to move to the East if awarded custody, Jay's 
visitation rights should be for relatively long blocks of time such as 
over a summer and/or for extended vacation periods. 
At trial, Dr. Cooper testified that it would be "best" for the child to 
maintain a "strong relationship" with both parents (R. 237). With respect to 
1 
the defendant's willingness to facilitate such a relationship between the child 
and plaintiff, he testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Leta) In your conversations with Mr. Lembach, 
did he ever say to you that he had any intention of precluding 
Barbara from having a meaningful relationship with Thaddeus? 
A Not as such, that I recall. 
Q Looking at the other side of the picture, m your 
conversations with Barbara, did she ever indicate or say anything 
to you that suggested that she did not want Jay to have a 
meaningful relationship with Thaddeus? 
A Yes , she did. 
Q What kind of things did she say in that regard? 
A She stated that not only did she feel that Mr. Lembach 
should not have custody, but he should be given no visitation 
rights. And if visitation rights were given, they ought to be 
supervised. 
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Nevertheless, Dr. Cooper believed that joint custody would be "best" for the 
child. He made an alternate recommendation, however, that defendant have 
custody with long blocks of unsupervised visitation for plaintiff because the 
joint custody situation "is problematic" when the parties "live a great distance 
apart from one another 11 (R. 247-248). 
Dr. Richard Schneiman, a specialist in child psychology and development 
and former child psychologist at Primary Children's Medical Center, also 
evaluated the parties and testified at trial (R. 165-191). Dr. Schneiman 
stated that both parties were "psychological parents" for the child (R. 268). 
However, as between the parties, Dr. Schneiman observed that plaintiff was 
more willing to accept defendant, more willing to engage in accomodation 
and/or compromise with defendant, more flexible, had greater trust, and 
exerted greater effort to be fair about sharing the child (R. 269, 272). As 
with Dr. Cooper, Dr. Schneiman testified that the "ideal" situation would be 
to order "joint custody" based on an "equal distribution of time" (R. 273), 
but that such a situation "becomes very difficult if defendant chooses to leave 
the area because of the geographic distances involved" (R. 273). 
Dr. Schneiman testified that children who are raised by one parent have 
a "greater likelihood of developing emotional problems" (R. 275). He also 
stated that children who are raised by parents who reflect animosity and 
hostility toward the opposite parent not only have difficulties relating to the 
non-custodial parent but in 80 percent of the cases experience divorce in 
their own marriages (R. 276-277). Such children have a higher incidence of 
"acting out" and experiencing "serious emotional disturbances," in his opinion 
- 5 -
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(R. 277). In light of this research, Dr. Schneiman expressed the view that 
the "most overriding factor" in selecting a custodial parent would be the 
"willingness of the divorced parents to negotiate and accommodate a shared 
way of raising the child" (R. 275). 
Based on his observations of the parties, Dr. Schneiman1s preference 
would be to place the child in the physical custody of the parent "who's the 
most flexible and accommodating of the parties" (R. 279). Dr. Schneiman also 
expressed the opinion that, as between the parties, the defendant was less 
likely to fallow through with whatever the court were to order (R. 282). 
Finally, Dr. Schneiman testified that plaintiff had a "greater ability to 
negotiate solutions" than did defendant (R. 290) and that it would be 
important for the child to maintain a strong 11 father-son relationshipn with 
plaintiff (R. 290). 
In addition to the cliff erences stated above, the evidence showed 
significant economic differences between the parties. Plaintiff owned a home, 
had regular income and had employable skills as a carpenter. Defendant, on 
the other hand, was unemployed, depended on welfare for her support, had 
made "no effort" to find employment, had no permanent residence, had not 
earned any significant income in the last three years, and had no definite 
plans for the future other than to move back to Connecticut to live with her 
parents. Neither of defendant's parents testified. Furthermore, defendant 
admitted that she was very hostile and agressive toward plaintiff (R. 348) 
· and that she did not want him to visit the child without the supervision of 
another adult ( R . 348) . 
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On the basis of the foreging evidence, the court entered its initial 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment (R. 137, 140). The court 
awarded custody of the child to defendant because of a "maternal 
presumption" that young children should be with their mothers unless they 
are unfit (R. 172, 383), because plaintiff was "insensitive" and "selfish" 
toward the defendant in refusing to marry her ( R. 361, 382, 386), and 
because plaintiff refused to "accept his responsibility" to legitimate the child 
through marriage (R. 361). 
After trial, plaintiff moved to amend the judgment and, on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence, moved for a new trial. The court partially 
granted the motion to amend but denied a new trial. This appeal ensued. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT APPLlED ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARDS 
IN RESOLVING THE CUSTODY DISPUTE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
From the record it is difficult to ascertain with precision what legal 
standard the trial court applied in resolving the custody dispute beween the 
parties. It is clear, however, that the court did not apply the same standard 
to plaintiff as it did to defendant and, in fact, applied tests which were 
contrary to law. 
- 7 -
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At the conclusion of the trial, the court said: 
. . . I have a difficult time accepting the concept of lack of 
flexibility on the part of the defendant, in view of your [plaintiff] 
apparent lack of flexibility in terms of accepting paternal 
responsibility in a direct sort of way. 
The Court, a year later, has legitimized the child, has adopted 
the child, and the plaintiff has adopted the child through 
acknowledgment of paternity under the statutes of the State of 
Utah, but it's clear that the child was, under the law, bastard for 
a year-.- Itappears -u) the Court that you 'vebeen selfish, that 
you've wanted to exercise your rights and privileges, much to the 
exclusion of the defendant, on your terms and on your conditions, 
and I think you've been very insensitive to her problems. She has 
had some emotional adjustments to make. Maybe fathers do, but we 
don't have them in the physical and emotional sense, as women do. 
We don't ~ through the physical and psychological changes that 
they do. 
I have a hard time understanding the view, in view of those 
circumstances, why you didn't legitimize that child by marriage and 
accept that respon5ibillty, even if it wouI<fresult in a divorce, so 
that at the time of the birth it was a legitimate child. Pm going to 
award custody to the defendant. The testimony of the experts is 
clear that they see neither one of you as unfit. I think there is no 
disagreement with either of them that the Court really shouldn't 
interfere with the child having a strong relationship with both. I 
think it's obvious to the Court that it is in the best interests of 
the child that it have two parents. She's not got the emotional 
support from you, and it appears natural that she would want to go 
back where her family is ... (R. 381-382). (emphasis added) 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the court preconditioned plaintiff's 
right to custody upon some sort of ill-defined sho\ving that he was "sensitive" 
to defendant's "emotional adjustment" and that he had "accepted parental 
responsibility in a direct sort of way" by "legitimizing" the child through 
marriage "even if it would result m a divorce." This standard imposes a 
greater burden upon the natural father of the child than upon the child's 
natural mother and has absolutely nothing to do with what is i..11 the child's 
· best interests. 
- 8 -
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The court's prejudice against plaintiff was made evident even before the 
.ose of the trial. During plaintiff's direct examination, the following colloquy 
risued between the court and the witness: 
BY THE COURT: 
Q Do you understand that in the eyes of the law Thaddeus 
is a bastard? 
A I don't understand the definition of a bastard. 
THE COURT: An illegitimate child born without the benefit of 
marriage? 
A Yes. 
MR. LETA: Your Honor, I would like to just make one 
mention of the record in this case, which indicates that Judge 
Duram [sic] has found the child to have been adopted for all 
purposes. 
Q (By the Court) Well, I recognize the order is in there, 
but I understand that the law does provide that if the parents 
aren't married, that under the laws of this state, the child would 
be a bastard. 
A I understand he's an illegitimate child, yes. 
Q Do you understand that he would have obtained 
legitimacy through the act of marriage? 
A Yes. 
Q Why would you choose not to legitimize him through the 
act of marriage? 
A I understood that he also gained legitimacy by being 
adopted. 
Q Do you feel that you have any real conception or feeling 
about what changes a woman is going through during gestation, 
emotional changes and feelings that she goes through? 
A During pregnancy? 
Q Yes. 
- 9 -
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A I've attempted to understand those, yes. 
Q Do you think you have got any conception or sensitivity 
about how that must be in a state of being not wedded? 
A I would say that I attempted to understand the feelings 
and other things that were going on with Barbara. I don rt believe 
that that was all that was going on with Barbara. In fact, the 
issue of marriage, she was strongly against being marriaed, and 
she only became interested in getting married after Thaddeus was 
born. 
Q Do you feel that during that particular period a woman 
need a little extra support and understanding? 
A I feel that both people need support, but, yes, I do feel 
the woman needs support, and I felt that I gave her extremely--a 
lot of support. 
Q Do you feel that you provided that? 
A Yes. 
(R. 321, 322) 
And, during the hearing on plain tiff's post trial motions, the court made the 
following remarks: 
THE COURT: . . . You may find, if it's not in there, that 
he got the gal pregnant and he refused to marry her and was 
insensitive generally to the female problems that she went through 
in terms of childbirth, and in fact has parents in the state of 
Connecticut, and that he by his conduct or actions discouraged her 
from going back where she belonged. (R ~ 382) 
* * * 
THE COURT: The only conclusion I reach from that evidence 
is that he's less than sensitive about what his individual 
responsibilities might be. And to say that he is the most 
responsible and most fit under those circumstances is shocking to 
the Court's conscience. (R. 386) 
The court obviously measured plaintiff's fitness by its subjective perception 
of his moral responsibility under the circumstances_, although no such 
standard was applied to the defendant or recognized in law. 
- 10 -
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~: 
The court also based its custody decision on an absolutely erroneous 
application of the "maternal presumption." In its conclusions of law the court 
states: 
2. Under case law in the State of Utah and under the 
common law of this State there is a Efesumption that ~ child of 
tender years should be in the custody of their mother unless the 
mother is unfit. In this case, no evidence has been presented that 
the mother is unfit to care for the child. Absent such a finding, 
custody should be awarded to the mother of the child. This 
conclusion is in addition to and is distinct from Conclusion of Law 
number 1 above. (emphasis added) 
This standard has no support m the current law of this state as will be 
shown below. 
Finally, the court applied a test respecting joint custody which, in 
effect, precluded such an award, even if such were in the best interest of 
the child. The court refused to even consider joint custody unless the 
parties were able to "negotiaten an arrangement on their own. At the 
conclusion of trial the court said: 
. . . The child needs some stability and consistency, which the 
experts recognized. They both recognize that the solution to joint 
custody is an ideal situation which is not in touch with the reality 
of this particular case. I have no reason to believe that she's 
going to disobey the Court's order about providing him access to 
his child, encouraging a good relationship. She performed 
admirably well under strange and strained circumstances. It's just 
unusual and out of the ordinary that a man assume the role you 
have taken during the pendency of these kinds of proceedings. 
You initated the action, and apparently there was some splitting up 
and sharing up to that particular time, and there 1s evidence that 
you do have problems that you can't see eye to eye on, you have 
cliff erences that you can't resolve on your own, and the joint 
custody relationship contemplates the situation where maybe the 
child can live in a close neighborhood with the two of you, the 
child can have one set of friends and a school that they rely upon, 
where the two parents can get together as adults and do 
everything, I suppose, but live together, and be able to handle 
their problems as a man and wife. (emphasis added) (R. 362-363) 
- 11 -
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The foregoing supports the conclusion that the trial court (a) measured 
plaintiff's "fitness" to have custody by his unwillingness to "legitimate" the 
child by marrying the defendant and by his "insensitivity" toward the 
defendant; (b) "presumed" that defendant should have custody unless she 
was unfit; and (c) refused to order joint custody unless the parties could 
"negotiate" the terms of the arrangement out of court. Each of these 
standards is erroneous and prejudiced plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is the natural, biological father of the child in issue, and 
therefore is capable of adopting the child by acknolwedgment in accordance 
with § 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647 
(U. 1980). That statute provides: 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as 
his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is 
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a 
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is 
thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate frOiil the time of its 
birth. The foreging provisions of this chapter do not apply to 
such an adoption. (emphasis added). 
The plaintiff adopted the child pursuant to this statute as Judge Durham 
recognized and as the evidence unequivocably demonstrates. See, State v. 
Dennis, 594 P. 2d 898 (Ut. 1979) . Judge Rigtrup erroneously believed, 
however, that the "adoption" was not effective until ~l•..:dge Durham entered 
her order on December 24, 1979 (R. 88), and that the child was a bastard 
from the time of its birth until that date. The statute clearly makes the child 
legitimate "for all purposes . . . from the time of its birth," contrary to 
Judge Rigtrup's belief. 
- 12 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Since the child was legitimate from birth, the proper test to apply in 
determining custody as between the natural parents would be to apply the law 
governing custody of legitimate children which is § 30-3-10, Utah Code 
Annotated (Supp. 1979). "The legislative purpose giving rise to [ § 78-30-12] 
is to confer on an illegitimate child the civil and social status of a lawful child 
of the natural father." Mace v. Webb, supra., at 648. See, In re Richard 
M., 122 Cal. Rptr. 531; 537 P.2d 363 (1975). Standards which prefer the 
natural mother of illegitimate children [See, e.g. § 77-60-12, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953)] have no place in custody disputes involving legitimate 
children. 
Section 30-3-10 provides: 
In any case of separation of husband and wife having minor 
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved, the 
court shall make such order for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the 
parties. The court may inquire of the children and take into 
consideration the children's desires regardng the future custody; 
however, such· expressed desires shall not be controlling and the 
court may, nevertheless, determine the children rs custody 
otherwise. 
Although the statute seems to apply only to separations of "husband and 
wife" or situations involving "void or dissolved" marriages, it is proper to 
apply this standard in the instant case because the relationship between the 
parties is analogous to a void marriage under § 30-1-3(3), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Even though the parties made no effort to solemize their 
relationship, they held themselves out as husband and wife. Thus, the court 
erroneously prejudiced plaintiff by requiring him to show defendant's 
"unfitnessn before he could obtain custody. 
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The trial court acknowledged that it was applying a strict maternal 
prefernce in the instant case. The most recent pronouncements of this court 
suggest that a maternal preference is proper only if all other things are equal 
between the parties. Otherwise, the sex of the parties plays no part in a 
custody dispute, and the best interests of the child must be the only 
consideration. nwhenever, pursuant to a consideration of such interests, anl 
circumstances in the case preponderate in favor of the husband, all things 
are not equal." Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599P.2d510 (Ut. 1979). 
Assuming, arguendo, that such a "maternal preference" is constitutional, the 
trial court erroneously applied the preference in the instant case. 
The circumstances m the instant case were not equal and clearly 
preponderated in favor of plaintiff. Both psychologists acknowledged that 
plaintiff was the more flexible and accommodating party. Plaintiff had 
superior financial capability and a more stable, permanent environment in 
which to raise the child. The court unjustif ably ignored these differences 
and, in fact, erroneously believed that financial capability had "no bearing on 
the issue" (R. 311). 
In the Jorgensen case, supra, one of the central considerations in 
support of the trial court's judgment that the father should be awarded 
custody was the fact that 11 plaintiff's present income was minimal" and that 
"defendant [was] responsible, [had] adequate employment. enjoy[ed] a 
particularly close relationship with his son, and [was] m all respects 
· competent to care for him." Id. at 512. Here, the sexual bias in the lower 
court's decision can be seen most vividly by simply reversing the tables and 
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asking the rhetorical question 11Would the court have awarded custody to this 
father if he were unemployed, had no permanent residence, had minimal 
earning capacity, were openly hostile and agressive toward his wife and had 
no definiate plans for the future?" The answer is obvious. The court's 
decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence and inconsistent with the 
standards announced by this court. 
Finally, the trial court applied an improper standard for determining 
whether to award joint custody between the parties. While there is no 
statutory authority in Utah permitting "joint custody" between divorced or 
separated parents (nor even a definition of the term), there is also no legal 
prohibition of a joint custody arrangement. In several cases this court has 
acknowledged that "split" or njointn custody is a proper form of relief and 
can be in the child's best interest. The court, however, has never instituted 
a test or standard for making such an award. See Sanders, Division of 
Clinical Custody in Utah, pp. 47-51, Utah Bar Journal, Spring 1977. 
Joint custody has been defined as giving both parents 11 legal 
responsibility for the children's care and alternating companionship." 
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and 
Remaining Problems: Primitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive 
Modifications, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 978, 1009 (1977). There has been no uniform 
application of the term "joint custody" and no single management which 
results when a joint award is made. Joint or divided custody decrees 
generally give both parents legal responsibility for the child's care. 
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Professional child psychologists are evenly split on the merits of joint 
custody, although there is almost universal recognition that children of 
divorce are subject to severe strain, loss of security and feelings of 
rejection. Roman, The Disposable Parent, 15 Conciliations Courts Review, 
No. 2, Del. 1977. The most strenuous arguments in opposition are that 
children in joint custody arrangements may suffer a lack of stability in their 
home environment or may fall prey to loyalty conflicts in attempting to 
maintain positive emotional ties to two hostile adults. Goldstein, et al., 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 37-38 (1973). 
On the other hand, proponents argue that fathers who have only 
"visitation 11 are relegated to seeing their children only intermittently, 
experience feelings of deep loss and often overreact by limiting their 
involvement with their children. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in 
Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. Fam L. 423 ( 1977) ; Annot. 70 A. L. R. 3d 262 
(1976). Further, there is no scientific data for the de facto preference in 
favor of mothers. In todays world of two career families, fathers are equally 
nurturant and competent to care for their offspring. See ~., Molinoff, Joint 
Custody: Victory for All, N. Y. Times 3-6-77, XXII 18: 1. Finally, and most 
importantly, a child needs a substantial involvement with both his parents. 
In the instant case, both psychologists recommended that joint custody 
be imposed by the court and each testified that such an arrangement would 
be "ideal" and "best" for the child. The trial court found that each party 
· was "fit" to have custody of the child (R. 172, paragraph 8). In fact, 
custody had been "divided between the parties pursuant to the order of the 
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Court 11 for over five months before trial (R. 172, paragraph 7). The court 
also found that "the best interests of the child would be served by 
maintaining a strong relationship with both parents" (R. 172, paragraph 9). 
Nevertheless, the court refused to award joint custody because it was 
"opposed" by defendant and because defendant planned to move to 
Connecticut. 
Plaintiff concedes that where the parties live a great distance from one 
another a joint custody arrangement on an equal-time basis is difficult, 
especially for young children. However, something less than equal time could 
have been ordered (Ex. P-1) under the circumstances. More importantly, 
both the court and the psychologists were mislead by defendant's statement 
about her future plans. As will be discussed below, defendant did not intend 
to leave the state permanently and in fact has been living in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on a continuous basis since June, 1980. 
Of equally serious consequence is the court's conclusion that joint 
custody could not be awarded because it was "opposed" by the defendant. 
Such a standadrd would render the court impotent to make an award which is 
best for the child simply because one parent opposes it. "A court must, in a 
custody dispute, give the highest priority to the welfare of the children over 
the desires of either parent." Kallas Vo Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Ut. 
1980). Obviously, whenever a matter is contested it will be "opposed" by one 
party. Thus, if the courtts standard represents the law, no court could ever 
award joint custody in a contested case. 
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Both psychologists found the parties to have nsimilar parenting skills 
and styles. n This should be the test in making an award between parents 
who are equally fit because it insures consistency and stability for the child 
and, at the same time, enables the child to develop a strong bond with both 
parents. This court should disavow the trial court's test and announce a 
proper standard to apply in resolving joint custody disputes. See Miller, 
Joint Custody, 13 Fam.L.Q. 1979, pp. 369-74. 
In summary, the trial court applied erroneous legal standards in this 
case. The court prejudiced plaintiff's right to custody because the child was 
born out of wedlock in spite of the child1s adoption "from birth" pursuant to 
§ 78-30-12. The court applied an absolutely erroneous "maternal preference 
test which required plaintiff to show defendant's "unfitness" before he could 
obtain custody. And, the court applied an inappropriate test for 
whether joint custody would be in the child's best interest. 
II 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTE AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Since a child custody proceeding is equitable and is based primarily and 
foremost on the welfare and interests of the minor children, this court can 
review the evidence and make an independent judgment about the proper 
resolution of the case, as well as determine whether the court abused its 
· discretion. In the case at bar, the findings and conclusions are simply not 
supported by the evidence. 
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In its conclusions, the trial court said: 
1. Considering all the circumstances, the best interest of the 
child Thaddeus Justin Lembach would be served by awarding 
Defendant sole and exclusive custody, subject to reasonable 
visitation by Plaintiff. 
The court's own findings, however, do not support this conclusion. For 
example, the only findings of the court on the question of which parent 
should have custody are the following: 
5. Since October 1977, Plaintiff has maintained a residence in 
Salt Lake City, Utah at 781 First Avenue. 
6. Since January 1, 1978, Defendant has not maintained any 
permanent employment between 8/15/78 and 6/6/79 and had primary 
responsibility for the care of the child of the parties. At the time 
of the trial Defendant was receiving public assistance from the State 
of Utah. 
7. Since October 2, 1979, custody of the minor child has 
been divided between the parties pursuant to the Order of this 
Court. 
8. Defendant is a fit and proper person to have custody of 
the child of the parties. Plaintiff is fit to have custody of the 
child. 
* * * 
11. Defendant plans to move to Connecticut to be close to her 
family. 
12. Plaintiff is employed full-time by Omni Structures and 
earns approximately $8.00 per hour or $16,000 per year. 
Clearly, these findings support the conclusion that plaintiff is more financially 
secure and more stable than is defendant. Since all other findings are either 
neutral or equal as between the parties, a preponderance of the evidence, 2x_ 
the court's own findings, compels the conclusion that the best interests of the 
child would be served by awarding custody to plaintiff, not defendant. 
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Without repeating what has been said above, the testimony at trial further 
demonstrates that the court's decision was arbitary. It is blatently obvious 
from the record that the trial court was biased against plaintiff because of his 
decision not to marry defendant, because of an erroneous misunderstanding 
about the effect of adoption pursuant to § 78-30-12, and because of a total 
misunderstanding of the "best interests n doctrine in this state. 
III 
APPLICATION OF ANY SEXUAL PREFERENCE IN CHILD 
CUSTODY DISPUTES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, LACKS 
ANY SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO AN IMPORTANT 
STATE INTEREST, AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the trial court 
discriminated against plaintiff because of his sex in at least three ways. 
First, the court imposed a great burden of proof upon plaintiff that it did 
upon defendant. Second, the court did not weigh the evidence in the same 
fashion for both parties, as when it discounted plaintiff's financial ability and 
his more stable home environment while placing an unwarranted premium upon 
defendant's nurturing ability because of her sex. Finally, the court 
discriminated against plaintiff by applying a legal standard which presumed 
that defendant should have custody unless plaintiff could prove that she was 
"unfit." 
Setting aside for the moment the fact that the court did not properly 
apply the "maternal preference" as outlined by this court in Jorgensen ~ 
Jorgensen, supra, any preference for one of the parties because of sex. even 
as permitted by Jorgensen, is unconstitutional and warrants reversal. 
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The right of a parent to the care, custody and nurture of his child is 
such a precious and fundamental right of all citizens that it cannot be 
deprived in a manner inconstistent with the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As the United States Supreme Court said in Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972): 
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the 
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have 
been deemed "essential," . . . "basic civil rights of man," . . . 
and "[r]ights far more precious .. o than property rights." ... 
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder. " . . . 
Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships 
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared 
unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, 
children a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, 
emphasizing that such children cannot be denied the right of other 
children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, 
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally 
organized family unit. . . . "To say that the test of equal 
protection should be the 'legal' rather than the biological 
relationship is to avoid the issue. 11 For the Equal Protection Clause 
necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal' lines 
't h " as 1 c ooses. . . . 
These authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stanley's 
interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and 
substantial. (citations omitted) 
Recently, the court again addressed this issue in Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380 (1979) where it held that a state statute which makes 
distinctions between the rights of unmarried mothers and the rights of 
unmarried fathers cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause unless it can be shown to be "substantially related to an 
important state interest. n In that case, the court found no justifiable basis 
for making any gender-based distinctions in connection with the right of 
natural parents to withhold consent in adoption proceedings. 
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A "maternal preference" in resolving custody disputes, whether applied 
only as a "tie-breaker" or otherwise, has no place under the equal protection 
clause of either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Utah Constitution. 
(Article I, § 2). There is no "substantial governmental objective" which such 
a preference serves and it would not be "substantially related to the 
achievement of those objections" if any could be concocted. Moreoever, such 
a preference is purely a creation of this court, which is contrary to 
legislative intent since it modifies the otherwise plain meaning of the 1977 
amendment to § 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953). The presumption also 
lacks vitality in fact. Roth, the Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody: 
Victory for All, supra; Annot. 76 A.L.R.3d 262. 
Without the benefit of facts supporting an nadoption" under statutes like 
§78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953), several courts have held that there 
are no presumptions in favor of the mother in a custody proceeding involving 
an illegitimate child and that the only standard is the "best interest of the 
child." Godinez v Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66· 
' 
266 N . Y . S . 2d 636 (1966); 
Commonwealth v Martin, 381 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1977); Bazemore v. Davis, 
394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. App. 1978); In re Domingo T., 48 L.W. 2208 (N.Y. 
Family Ct. 1979). 
In addition, several courts, including the Supreme Court of Nevada, 
(Arnold v. Arnold, 604 P. 2d 109 (Nv. 1979)) have abolished the maternal 
presumption in all child custody disputes. even as a tie-breaker, for the 
· reason that the presumption is a judicial crutch for avoiding the often 
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difficult decision of the child's best interest. See, also, McAndrew v. 
McAndrew, 46 L. W. 2462 (Md. 1978); Commonwealth v. Carson, 368 A. 2d 635 
(Pa. 1977). The Nevada court's discussion m Arnold is particuarly 
noteworthy because of the striking similarity between the law m Nevada and 
in Utah. Finally, at least one state court has held that the maternal 
preference is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. State 
ex rel. Watts v Watts, 350 N. Y. S. 2d 285 (1973). 
Preferences and presumptions should play no role in child custody 
disputes. The children in issue deserve standards which realistically advance 
their best interest. In todays world mothers do not hold a monopoly on the 
subject of child rearing and in many situations can be a worse role model 
than a working father. The choice of which parent is "best" for the child 
seldom is often difficult, especially where both parents want the child. But 
the choice must not be avoided by the use of easy, inadequate preferences 
and assumptions. 
For these reasons, this court should reverse the trial court and should 
take this opportunity to abolish the maternal preference in all child custody 
disputes. 
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IV 
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
After the trial, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence showing that defendant intended to make Utah, not 
Connecticut, her home (R. 104). Before trial, plaintiff had sought the 
production of all public assistance applications submitted by defendant since 
July 1, 1977 (R. 29, no. 7). The documents were not produced prior to trial 
because defendant claimed that they could not be obtained from the public 
authorities, and plaintiff could not obtain the documents directly because of 
various privacy limitations. 
The application which was finally produced (R. 108) was submitted on 
November 5, 1979, and contains an affirmative answer, under oath, to the 
I 
question "Do you intend to make your home in Utah?" (R. 108, no. 12). 
The application also contains material information about defendant's income, 
property, residence and financial affairs, all of which were important facts 
for the court to consider in connection with the custody issue. 
In support of the motion, plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of 
Dr. Cooper (R. 165) which states that had he known about defendant's prior 
sworn statement at the time he conducted his interviews he "would have 
questioned her much more thoroughly about her stated intent to return to 
Connecticut to live with her parents and this fact also would have played a 
role in [his] recommendation." 
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The evidence shown by this application was extremely important and 
warranted a new trial. First. it tends to impugn defendant's credibility and 
honesty, which not only creates doubt about other aspects of her testimony, 
but also raises serious implications about her moral standing and character as 
a parent. It suggests that defendant is willing to lie or stretch the truth for 
the purpose of manipulating the rules to her own advantage. Second, it 
directly contradicts her stated intent to leave Utah which was a central 
consideration in the joint custody determination. Finally, it seriously 
hampered plaintiff's ability to purge defendant's testimony on 
cross-examination. Because of the character of this evidence, and its 
importance to the issues in dispute, a new trial was warranted under the 
standards governing such motions. See, Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 6A Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 59.08(3] (2nd Ed. 1979); 
Denial of the motion under the circumstances constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The fore going discussion demonstrates that the trial court did not 
understand the proper legal standards to apply in resolving the issues in 
dispute between the parties. The court measured plaintiff's fitness by 
subjective standards of morality concerning whether it would have been right 
or proper for the plaintiff to "legitimate" the child by marrying the defendant 
in spite of the clear language of § 78-30-12 to the contrary. The court 
further prejudiced plaintiff's ability to obtain custody by requiring the 
defendant to somehow cure a perceived "insensitivity" to the defendant. 
There is no support in the law in this state for standards and burdens of 
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this kind. Moreover, since these tests were not applied to both parties, the 
injury to the plaintiff is more manifest. 
The court also failed to understand the proper application of the 
maternal presumption or tender years doctrine. The court assumed that a 
child of tender years should be with its mother unless the mother is "unfit." 
In fact, the doctrine only applies in the case of a tie when all things are 
equal between the parties. The application of this standard prejudicially 
increased plaintiff's burden of proof. The court's standard for resolving the 
joint custody question was not only unrealistic and unworkable but also 
contrary to the child's best interest. 
The trial court not only applied erroneous standards of law in resolving 
the dispute but its decision is not supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence and demonstrates an abuse of discretion. The situation between the 
parties was far from equal and, as the court's own findings illustrate, was 
weighted in favor of the plaintiff. Both plaintiff and defendant were 
acknowledged by all to be "fit" parents. There is nothing in the evidence, 
and in particular in the court's findings, to illustrate why the plaintiff was 
less fit than the defendant or, for that matter, why the defendant was more 
fit than the plaintiff. However, the record is clear, that plaintiff's income 
exceeded that of the defendant, that his work and employment history were 
more regular and stable than that of the defendant, and that his home 
• 
environment was more stable and permanent than that of the defendant. 
.. Moreover, both psychologists testified that plaintiff was more accommodating 
and flexible than was the defendant. These differences, under the 
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circumstances, were not insignificant; they tipped the scales of "best 
interest" in plaintiff's favor. Disregarding these differences, renders the 
trial court's conclusions wholly arbitrary and capricious. 
The trial court also discrllninated between the parties on the basis of 
sex. Such discrllnination has no place in the resolution of a child custody 
dispute where the parties have an equal right to the care, custody and 
nurture of their child. Application of any discrimination, including the 
maternal presumption as currently applied by the courts of this state, is an 
unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and in Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, the court abused its discretion in failing to grant plaintiff a new 
trial because the newly discovered evidence was of a material and substantial 
nature and would have probably affected the outcome of the trial. 
For all of these reasons, therefore, this court should reverse and 
remand the case to the district court with directions to enter judgment in 
favor of plaintiff that he be awarded custody of the child with liberal and 
reasonable visitation for the defendant or, in the alternative, reverse and 
remand the case to the district court for a new trial with directions as to the 
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proper standards to apply m resolving the issues in dispute between the 
parties. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day 0. 
D d E. Leta 
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